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Abstract 
The Maryland Declaration of Rights proclaims "That every 
freeman, for any injury done to him in his person, or property, ought to 
have remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought to have 
justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay, according to the Law of the Land." America's 
litigation lawyers know that these fine words do not describe the reality 
of our system of civil justice. Last year the American College of Trial 
Lawyers pronounced our system a "captive to cost, delay and 
gamesmanship" and "in serious need of repair." The Iqbal decision is an 
attempt to deal with one of many failings of our system. 
Globalization challenges America to construct a system of civil 
justice that works. Foreign parties find litigating here a "nightmare." 
So, too, do our own people, but they do not know alternatives. The 
Report of the American College of Trial Lawyers reminds us that our 
foreign friends know alternatives that work well; no wonder that they are 
disappointed here. 
This article is based on a forthcoming book that examines from 
beginning to end, a lawsuit in three countries: the United States, 
Germany and Korea. The book shows ways that one foreign legal 
system minimizes costs and delay and promotes decisions according to 
justice and right. The draft chapters of the book are available online at 
http://ssrn.com/author=825054. 
This article puts pleading in historical and comparative 
perspectives. It shows how past and present systems of American 
pleading have failed while the German system succeeds. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article is based on a book that is nearing publication. The book 
is over two hundred pages. It is a comparative introduction to three 
systems of civil justice-American, German and Korean-presented 
through a biography of the same lawsuit in three systems. 
In this article, I focus on aspects related to the Iqbal case. I have 
four points: 
• The Iqbal decision confirms the breakdown of 
contemporary American civil procedure. We know what 
civil procedure should do, and we know that our civil 
procedure is not doing it. Civil procedure should facilitate 
determining rights according to law. It should help courts 
and parties apply law to facts accurately, fairly, 
expeditiously and efficiently. This article reflects on three 
historic American system failures and reports a foreign 
success story. 
• Pleadings can help courts do what we know courts should 
do: decide a case on the merits, accurately, fairly, 
expeditiously and efficiently. Pleadings facilitate a day in 
court when focused on deciding according to law. Pleadings 
are, however, only part of the process of determining rights 
and of applying law to facts. They cannot do it all. Their 
utility is limited by the interdependent nature of determining 
law and finding facts to apply law to facts. 
• The United States has had three principal systems of civil 
procedure; 1 all three have failed. The United States has used 
three principal forms of pleading-common law pleading, 
fact pleading, and notice pleading; all three have proven 
inadequate. None has achieved both accuracy and 
expedition; none has managed both fairness and efficiency. 
1. In order to keep this article within bounds, I do not address equity procedure, 
which complemented legal procedure and which I am considering as part of the common 
law system. Equity procedure contributed substantially to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1987); 
Amalia D. Kessler, Our InqUisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the 
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1181 (2005). I justify 
this simplification on the ground that equity was intended, in most matters, to 
complement common law procedure to deal with the exceptional rather than the routine, 
and that it too did not work well. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, JR., A STATEMENT OF FACTS 
IN RELATION TO THE DELAYS AND ARREARS OF BUSINESS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A CHANGE IN ITS ORGANIZATION 
(1838); CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1852). 
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Although wildly different in what they have required of 
pleading, all three systems of civil procedure have shared 
common flaws: they have expected too much of lawyers and 
not enough of judges. They have allowed issue deciding to 
substitute for law applying. 
• Since 1877 Germany has had only one system of civil 
procedure; that system has worked well. It has stood the test 
of time. Its unchallenged and unchanged basic principle is 
that parties provide facts and courts apply law. Da mihi 
factum, dabo tibi jus. Parties and courts cooperate. Pleading 
is only the beginning of that cooperation. Pleading leads 
directly to a day in court. Pleading directs the court down 
the path to a decision according to law. 
One caveat: pleading is only a part of civil procedure. Indeed, that 
is part of my thesis. This symposium is about the Iqbal decision and 
about pleading. Here, I largely limit myself to pleading. Space does not 
allow me to consider other aspects of civil justice systems. In my book, I 
have attempted to deal with systems as wholes. 
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE'S CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS 
The essential purpose of civil procedure is the determination of 
rights and duties among private parties according to law. Determining 
the rights and duties of parties resolves their disputes. If there were no 
civil procedure, private parties might use self-help to realize rights and to 
resolve disputes. The stronger, rather than the righteous, would prevai1.2 
The basic requirements of civil procedure are well known: accurate 
determinations of right, reached through fair process, without delay, and 
freely available to everyone, i.e. accurate, fair, expeditious, and 
efficient. 3 We state these expectations in our state constitutions in what 
we call "open courts" clauses. Our Founding Fathers declared them in 
state declarations of rights that they made coincident with our 
2. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*2 (1768; 1st Am. ed., Philadelphia, 1772) ("The more effectually to accomplish the 
redress of private injuries, courts of justice are instituted in every civilized society, in 
order to protect the weak from the insults of the stronger, by expounding and enforcing 
those laws, by which rights are defined, and wrongs prohibited."). 
3. Cf. John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN 
CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53,54-55 (A.A.S. Zuckerman, 
Sergio Chiarloni & Peter Gottwald eds. 1999) (after discussing fairness and asserting 
radical disagreement among systems about goals, then states: "[b]ypassing for the 
moment the debate about goals, we might fix on three fairly trite-criteria for appraising a 
procedural system: the cost of litigation, the time needed to resolve disputes, and the 
accuracy with which the system finds the facts and applies the law."). 
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Declaration of Independence. The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 
1776, which with only the slightest change is part of the Maryland 
Constitution today, proclaims: "That every freeman, for any injury done 
to him in his person, or property, ought to have remedy by the course of 
the Law of the Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without 
sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to 
the Law of the Land.,,4 The Pennsylvania Constitution is similar.5 
A. "The civil justice system is . .. in serious need of repair ,,(j 
The Iqbal decision is a modest-if ineffectual-attempt to fix a 
system that is, according to a report of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers, "in serious need of repair.,,7 Here, I won't try to convince you 
of that. If you are a lawyer, you already know it. If you are client, 
chances are, you have already experienced it. If you are a student, and 
you have done a litigation internship, you have at least sensed it. If you 
are a student and have not done a litigation internship, you may still 
believe the law school myth that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 
1938 fixed everything. 8 
They did not. Make no mistake about it: no competent lawyer 
would claim that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attain their stated 
goal of "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.,,9 It is doubtful that they do that in the majority of cases. 
They certainly do not do that if one takes into account all the cases that 
are not brought because the rules are unsatisfactory. Criticisms are 
legion and come from both the right and from the left, and from both 
lawyers in the trenches all the way up to Chief Justices of the United 
States. 10 
4. Art. 17, Maryland Declaration of Rights of Nov. 3, J 776, in THE DECISIVE BLOW 
IS STRUCK, A FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION 
OF 1776 AND THE FIRST MARYLAND CONSTITUTION (1977). The only material difference 
in the current constitution acknowledges the end of slavery: "man" substitutes for 
"freeman." 
5. PA. CONST. art. 1 § 11 ("All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury 
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of 
law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."). 
6. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REpORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT 
OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE 
INSTITUTE FOR THE Anv ANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009) [hereinafter 
"ACTL REpORT"]. 
7. Id. 
8. Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 53. 
9. FED. R. CIV. P. l. A German lawyer might reasonably say this if "every" were 
qualified by "almost." See text at note 1 0 1 infra. 
10. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Speech to the American Bar Association (February 
12, 1984), reprinted at Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, The State of Justice, 
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American civil procedure does not routinely determine rights 
accurately, through fair process, and without delay. It is not efficient: its 
costs are not proportionate to matters in controversy. Civil justice is not 
available to all. Only exceptionally are lawsuits decided on their merits. 
Only infrequently do they settle without major consideration being given 
to process costs. 11 
The Iqbal decision is a response to that breakdown. It is an attempt 
to fix a broken system. Those who criticize the Iqbal decision should 
bear in mind the Court's goal of system reform. Critics should not just 
call for return to some idyllic past where things worked for a class of 
cases of interest to them. They should offer ideas that contribute to 
fixing the system, not for some cases, but for all. 
B. Taking Advantage o/What has been Done by the Civil Lawl2 
My purpose is to bring into consideration foreign ideas that can 
contribute to fixing the system for all cases. I am encouraged that 
colleagues at that other Pennsylvania law school, earlier in this very year, 
called upon American scholars to do just that. 13 With that 
encouragement, and with knowledge that Penn State, thanks to its former 
Dean and my long time friend and supporter, Louis Del Duca, is in the 
forefront of international legal studies, I am confident that I do not need 
to convince this symposium of the benefits of comparative law. 
Just in case, however, a few of you, although committed to 
international legal studies, are skeptical whether comparative study has 
something to offer in the field of civil procedure, let me reassure you that 
there is nothing suspect about measuring our procedure against 
procedure elsewhere in the world. The authors of our systems of 
70 A.B.A.J. 62, 66 (April 1984) ("Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, 
too inefficient for a truly civilized people."); Earl Warren, Foreword, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL COMMIITEE ON COURT CONGESTION, TEN CURES FOR COURT 
CONGESTION 7 (1959) ("Intenninable and unjustifiable delays in our courts are today 
compromising the basic legal rights of countless thousands of Americans and, 
imperceptibly, corroding the very foundations of constitutional government in the United 
States.") 
11. Some scholars assert that forcing settlements-no matter what the grounds-are 
beneficial. 
12. The French jurist, Pierre LePaulle, who after expressing "his amazement at the 
ineffective manner in which justice is administered ... more like a high church ceremony 
than a business transaction," asked "Why don't you take advantage of what has been 
done by the civil law, that governs at least twice as many people as the common law, is 
two thousand years older, and embodies a much greater amount of human experience?" 
Quoted in Edson R. Sunderland, Book Review, 15 A.B.A.J. 35 (1929). 
13. Catherine T. Struve, Foreword, Procedure as Palimpsest, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 
421,433-34 (2010); Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 
158 U. PA. L. REv. 441 ,passim (2010). 
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procedure and of pleading took account of foreign law. Supreme Court 
Justice Joseph Story, who wrote the first American text on pleading/4 
and who did more than any other person to make an American law,15 told 
the bar: "There is no country on earth which has more to gain than ours 
by the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence . . .. Let us not vainly 
imagine that we have unlocked and exhausted all the stores of juridical 
wisdom and policy.,,16 David Dudley Field, author of the Field Code, 
asked: "Why might we not have comparative law, to place the legal 
systems of different countries and ages side by side, that the lawyer may 
profit by the history of the world? He is, perhaps, the only man of 
science who does not look beyond his own commonwealth, and to whom 
the history of other countries is as a sealed book.,,17 
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 and of 
its pleading provisions were aware of foreign counterparts. Judge 
Charles E. Clark, principal draftsman, wrote admiringly of European 
pleading practices: "We tend towards the civil law system; we shall 
probably not reach it for many generations, if at all.,,18 Professor Edson 
R. Sunderland, mastermind of the pretrial provisions including pleading, 
reminded us that "[l]itigation is merely a means to an end, like 
transportation, and the same tests should apply to both. No American 
objects to the use of the Diesel engine because it is of German origin 
. . .. In every field of human activity outside of the law men are 
constantly searching for new and better methods, overcoming the barriers 
oflanguage and forgetting the prejudices of nationality and race.,,19 
This article addresses pleading in only one foreign legal aystem, 
that of Germany. I have chosen Germany because the German system of 
civil procedure is among the most influential of all systems of civil 
14. JOSEPH STORY, A SELECTION OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO 
THE DECLARATION (1805). 
15. See ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA IN AMERICAN LAW 140-143 (1938). 
16. Joseph Story, Progress of Jurisprudence, Address at the Suffolk Bar on their 
Anniversary (September 4, 1821), reprinted in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH 
STORY 198, 235 (1852). See also James Kent, An Introductory Lecture to a Course of 
Law Lectures 15 (1794) reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE 
FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 936, 945 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 
1983). 
17. David Dudley Field, Study and Practice of Law, 14 U.S. MAG & DEM. 
REv.(1844), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF 
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 491 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884). Both Field and Story were in touch 
with C.F.A. Mittermaier, a European leader in the study of foreign law of the day. Story 
wrote an article on American law for Mittermaier's journal on foreign law. See Felix 
Frankfurter, Forward, 3 AM. J. COMPo L. 1 (1954). I own a set oflaw reform tracts from 
the 1840s that Field presented to Mittermaier. 
18. Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REv. 
517,543 (1925). 
19. Edson R. Sunderland, Current Legal Literature, 15 A.B.A. J. 35 (1929). 
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procedure in the world?O It is influential, because it works.21 It works for 
a country similar to ours in values and economy. Gennany is the most 
populous and most important Member State of the 27-Member European 
Union. 
C. What of American Exceptionalism? 22 
What of American "exceptionalism" in civil justice? Are our goals 
so similar? Placed in the best light, American exceptionalism means, 
with respect to procedure, that American civil procedure attempts things 
that other systems do not, e.g., it makes new law or it promotes social 
action.23 Other contributions to this symposium address how the Iqbal 
decision may undercut those goals of civil procedure. 
The goals of American exceptionalism are laudable. Whether civil 
litigation is the optimal way to achieve those goals is beyond the bounds 
of this article.24 That there are limits to systemic refonn through 
litigation is well-recognized?5 
In any case, we need not address that point here. Even the most 
enthusiastic adherents of American exceptionalism and of instrumental 
uses of procedure, however, ought to acknowledge that we should expect 
American civil procedure, while attempting the exceptional, to 
accomplish the mundane. 
Think of civil procedure as a multifunction machine such as you are 
accustomed to use with computers. Would you buy a combination 
scanner/printer to do both functions, if it did only one passably well? 
No. You expect a multi-function device to do multiple functions well. 
20. See generally, DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZE6RECHT UNO SEINE AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF 
ANDERE RECHTSORDNUNGEN (Walther J. Habscheid, ed. 1991). 
21. See text at note 101 infra. 
22. On "American Exceptionalism in Federal Civil Pleading," see Dodson, supra 
note 13, at 447-55. 
23. In its worst light: our peculiar institution. 
24. Some American jurists see litigation as a route to law reform better than 
legislation. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Litigation Explosion, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 189 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 
2008). Commonly they point to the famous decision in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (disapproving segregation) as an example of law reform 
through cases. Yet even that triumph of litigation depended on legislation for realization, 
e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State 
and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 
ALA. L. REv. 397,440 (1999). 
25. See, e.g., Joel Stashenko, Cost of Suit to Improve Defense of the Indigent Raises 
Concerns, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 2010, at 1 (reports on review of a motion to dismiss). 
Judge Robert S. Smith of the New York Court of Appeals questioned the plaintiffs 
attorney: "Isn't that a problem with systemic failure questions? What you're really 
doing ... by upholding the complaint, you've signed a blank check that someone is going 
to have to fill in later?" 
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So, too, should our civil procedure. It should decide mundane cases as 
well as exceptional ones. It should meet or beat minimum standards for 
civil procedure generally. We tum to those standards shortly. 
Ill. PLEADING AND ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 
In the course of administering justice between litigating parties, there 
are two successive objects,-to ascertain the subject for decision, and 
to decide. 
Stephen on Pleading (1824-1921 )26 
Civil procedure is a process for applying law to facts to resolve 
disputes. Its goal is facilitating decisions according to law. It is the 
practical implementation of legal reasoning. Pleadings commence that 
process. Proceedings continue it. Judgments conclude it.27 
We expect more of civil procedure than accurate outcomes. We 
have expectations of the process itself. We expect that process will be 
fair, expeditious and efficient. While we have not previously discussed it 
in this article, we also expect that an authorized body will reach those 
decisions. Pleading can contribute to fulfilling these needs of civil 
procedure. 
26. This is the first sentence of the leading work in nineteenth century America on 
civil procedure, HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON TIffi PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CrvrL 
ACTIONS; CoMPRISING A SUMMARY VIEW OF TIffi WHOLE PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT AT LAw 1 
(Philadelphia, Abraham Small, 1824). The first American edition appeared in the year of 
the first edition in London, 1824. Before the Civil War, there were six subsequent 
editions by Francis J. Troubat. After the Civil War there were many more editions by 
different editors, among them one by that icon of the common law, Samuel Williston, in 
1895. Other editions included those by Franklin Fiske Heard (1867), Samuel Tyler 
(multiple editions from 1871 to 1919), and James DeWitt Andrews (multiple editions 
1894-1901). It was epitomized in other books. 
Only seven years after the last edition of STEPHEN ON PLEADING appeared in 1921, 
Judge Charles E. Clark, later principal draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
of 1938, published the first edition of his own treatise, Clark ON CODE PLEADING. It 
begins similarly: "Before any dispute can be adjusted or decided it is necessary to 
ascertain the actual points at issue between the disputants." CHARLES C. CLARK, 
HANDBOOK OF CODE PLEADING 2 (2nd ed. 1947) (1st ed. 1928). When pleading and 
practice, as topics of study, were merged into civil procedure, the emphasis was lost, but 
the goal was not forgotten. Fleming James in the first paragraph of his first chapter on 
pleading in his 1965 text, Civil Procedure reminds us of it. In its current 2001 edition it 
reads: "The issues of fact and of law must be framed clearly enough so that the tribunal 
knows what to decide." FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & JOHN 
LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 180 (5th ed. 2001). 
27. For a discussion in English of German judgments, see James R. Maxeiner, 
Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It, 114 PENN STATE L. REv. 469 
(2009). 
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A. The Purposes of Pleading and the Needs of Civil Procedure 
Historically, American pleadings have served three principal 
purposes: (1) establishing jurisdiction of the court to consider the 
controversy; (2) directing proceedings to material issues that the parties 
dispute; and (3) bounding the controversy?S 
A successful system of civil procedure requires that the system 
accomplish all three of these purposes. It does not require, however, that 
these purposes be accomplished exclusively, or even partly, by pleading. 
The American system of common law pleading is an example of a 
system where pleading was intended to accomplish all three purposes. 
The contemporary system of notice pleading, on the other hand, 
principally uses pleading to establish jurisdiction; it makes little use of 
pleadings to direct or bound proceedings. The proposal of the American 
College of Trial Lawyers to return to fact pleading would restore 
directing and bounding to pleading.29 In this article we leave 
establishing jurisdiction to one side. 
Directing proceedings to material issues in dispute was the raison 
d' etre of common law pleading. Common law pleading did not merely 
direct proceedings to material issues in dispute: through pleading the 
lawyers defined a single issue to determine the dispute between their 
clients. Stephen on Pleading, the most popular text on civil procedure in 
America throughout the nineteenth century, stated pleading's role 
clearly: "In the course of administering justice between litigating parties, 
there are two successive objects,-to ascertain the subject for decision, 
and to decide.,,30 At one and the same time, the court decided an issue 
and applied the law. Of course, the parties' lawyers, by defining the 
issue, had already done most of the work in applying law to fact. 
Deciding what to decide is essential to accurate decisions according 
to law; deciding what not to consider, i.e., bounding the controversy, is 
essential to fair, expeditious and efficient decisions. Going off point not 
only delays final decisions of right, it makes those decisions more costly. 
Setting bounds to the controversy conserves party resources. Setting 
28. Cf Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and Function of the Complaint: Common 
Law-Codes-Federal Rules, 14 VAND. L. REv. 899 (1961); FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 2.2 (\ 965). 
29. ACTL REpORT, supra note 6, at 5 ("The Purpose o(Pleadings: Pleadings should 
notify the opposing party and the court of the factual and legal basis of the pleader's 
claims or defenses in order to define the issues of fact and law to be adjudicated. They 
should give the opposing party and the court sufficient information to determine whether 
the claim or defense is sufficient in law to merit continued litigation. Pleadings should 
set practical limits on the scope of discovery and trial and should give the court sufficient 
information to control and supervise the progress of the case to trial or other 
resolution.") (emphasis in original). 
30. STEPHEN, supra note 26. 
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bounds to the controversy protects parties from surprise. Parties need to 
prepare their cases only on matters before the court. 
Bounding the controversy has an importance that transcends process 
efficiency: protection of the autonomy of parties and the privacy of the 
public. In all three of our systems of civil justice, while courts are 
required to decide all private disputes properly brought to them, they are 
prohibited from investigating on their own initiative matters not brought 
to them by the parties. The court cannot properly examine or decide 
those matters not before the court. 
B. What Law Applying Requires of Civil Procedure 
Applying law to facts to decide cases on their merits requires 
determining applicable rules, finding facts, and applying rules to facts. 
This is considerably more difficult than is generally supposed. The legal 
rule cannot always be read from a single statute or precedent. It often is 
necessary to search statutes and precedents, analyze them, compare them 
to facts, revisit statutes and precedents in light of the facts, and again 
examine facts in light of the law. The end result is to bring facts and law 
together. 
Substantive law, as distinguished from procedural law, determines 
rights and duties abstractly. Civil procedure translates those abstract 
statements of rights and duties into determinations of rights and duties in 
individual cases. Its method is legal reasoning. Some form of legal 
reasoning is universal among modem legal systems.3l 
31. Accord FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, A NEW INfRODUCTION 
TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (2009). See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THfNKING LIKE A 
LAWYER: AN INfRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1996); KARL ENGISCH, EiNFOHRUNG 
IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN (9th ed. 1997). Dean Vandevelde provides a concise 
definition of legal reasoning in the United States: 
1. identify the applicable sources of law, usually statutes and judicial 
decisions; 
2. analyze these sources of law to determine the applicable rules of law and the 
policies underlying those rules; 
3. synthesize the applicable rules of law into a coherent structure in which the 
more specific rules are grouped under the more general ones; 
4. research the available facts; and 
s. apply the structure of the rules to the facts to ascertain the rights or duties 
created by the facts, using the policies underlying the rules to resolve 
difficult cases. 
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INfRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING 2 (1996). Dean Vandevelde's formulation is not the only one found in the 
United States. Other formulations emphasize legal argument more and law application 
less. See, e.g., WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT (2002). But Dean 
Vandevelde's formulation is within the American mainstream. For an English translation 
of a leading German text, see REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, INfRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL 
METHODS (2008). 
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Legal reasoning relies on syllogisms for application of law.32 The 
classic syllogism consists of a major premise, a minor premise and a 
conclusion. A famous example is: "All men are mortal; Socrates is a 
man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. ,,33 
Typically a legal rule consists of more than one element. Each 
element may itself require application of other rules to determine if the 
prerequisite is satisfied. Only if all elements are present in a particular 
case, does the rule apply. American procedure generally has the parties 
decide which rules apply and to define which elements are in dispute; it 
has courts only resolve those issues the parties present to them. 
The process of rule application thus requires finding substantive law 
governing the case (law-finding), finding facts that fulfill a governing 
substantive rule (fact-finding), and applying the rule to the case to 
produce the consequence mandated by it (law-applying). Thus rule 
application brings facts and law together to produce a legal consequence 
(often a right or duty). It presupposes that someone has already made the 
laws to be applied (lawmaking). 
C. The Limits of Pleading-The Interdependency of Law and Fact 
Applying law to facts requires determining law and finding facts. 
Only then can law be applied to facts to decide cases correctly. 
Determining applicable rules and finding material facts are 
interdependent inquiries: until one knows which rules are applicable, 
one cannot know which facts are material. Until one knows the facts, 
one cannot know which rules are applicable. Settle the applicable rules 
too soon, and facts may be overlooked which would change results were 
other rules applied. Fail to settle the applicable rules soon enough and 
the process may detour to find facts that are not material under the rules 
actually applied. This process of going back and forth was identified in 
32. VANDEVELDE,Supra note 31, at 19-20,67-70. 
33. A legal rule typically states that whenever a generally described prerequisite (P) 
exists, a certain consequence (C) applies. The rule thus takes the form of a syllogism: 
whenever the rule's prerequisite (P) is realized in a factual situation (F), then the 
consequence (C) applies. This is the major premise. The minor premise is that this 
factual situation (F) fulfills the prerequisite (P), that is, F is a case of P. The conclusion 
then logically follows that for the factual situation F, consequence C applies. 
Schematically: 
P -+ C (For P-that is, for every case P-C applies) 
F = P (F is a case of P) 
F -+ C (For F, C applies). 
There is nothing mystical about syllogistic reasoning. Justice Antonin Scalia of the 
United States Supreme Court and his co-author rhetorician Bryan A. Gamer wryly 
observe that even though we may have never studied logic, all of us use syllogistic 
reasoning. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF 
PERSUADING JUDGES 41 (2008). 
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the first part of the twentieth century, but to this day is only occasionally 
noted.34 
Directing process to the material points in dispute and bounding 
process from going off on unproductive paths are benefits that pleading 
can deliver. While essential to efficient process, directing and binding 
procedure are necessarily tentative if procedure is to achieve correct 
decisions according to law through fair process. It is a truism of lawsuits 
that no one can predict with certainty what the process will tum up in the 
way of facts and legal issues. An issue that may not have been apparent 
at the outset may become central to decision.35 
The Final Report of the American College of Trial Lawyers 
recognizes that "it is not always possible to understand complex fact 
situations in detail at an early stage .... ,,36 It therefore proposes 
development of a new summary procedure to deal with issues piecemeal 
without triggering an automatic right to discovery or trial?7 
D. Iqbal and the Limits of Pleading 
The Iqbal majority opinion holds that under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure plaintiffs need to allege in their complaints facts that 
plausibly fulfill the requirements of specific causes of action. Some 
critics charge that the Court has restored fact pleading without proper 
34. See JESSE FRANKLIN BRUMBAUGH, LEGAL REASONING AND BRIEFING: LOGIC 
ApPLIED TO THE PREPARATION, TRIAL AND APPEAL OF CASES, WITH ILLUSTRATIVE BRIEFS 
AND FORMS 364-367 (1917); THOMAS A. MANUET, PRETRIAL 21 (7th ed. 2008) ("This 
process, going back and forth between investigating the facts and researching the law, is 
ongoing and is how you will develop your 'theory of the case' .... "); OSKAR HARTWIEG 
& H.A. HESSE, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG 1M ZNILPROZEB: EIN STUDIENBUCH OBER METHODE, 
RECHTSGEFUHL UNO ROUTINE IN GUTACHTEN UNO URTEIL 78-79 (1987) (Die Lehre vom 
Pendelblick); Dieter Stauder with David Llewellyn, Oskar Hartwieg's Thoughts on the 
English Legal System, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: ARTICLES IN 
HONOUR OF WILLIAM R. CORNISH 47, 51 (D. Vaver and L. Bently 2004); HERBERT 
SCHOPF, DIE WECHSELBEZIEHUNG ZWISCHEN SACHVERHALT UNO NORMENORDNUNG BEl 
DER RECHTSANWENDUNG (Diss. Erlangen under Reinhold Zippelius, 1971). Arthur T. 
von Mehren conceived of this problem in terms of concentration and surprise at trial. See 
Arthur T. von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the 
Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, 2 EUROPAISCHES RECHTSDENKENS IN 
GESCHICHTE UNO GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFT FOR. HELMUT COING ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 
361 et seq. (Norbert Hom ed., 1982), relevant parts substantially reproduced in ARTHUR 
T. VONMEHREN, &PETERL. MURRAY, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed., 2007). 
35. See Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a 
Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1191 (2010). 
36. ACTL REpORT, supra note 6, at 6. 
37. Id. One of the principal points relied upon to challenge fact pleading by 
advocates of the Federal Rules was that one could not distinguish between law and fact. 
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procedures of amendment of the Rules.38 Others in this Symposium 
address that issue.39 
Many scholars have criticized the Iqbal decision and its predecessor 
Twombly. Some complain that these decisions deny litigants access to 
liberal discovery.4o Some believe that the Court's concern with 
burdensome discovery is misplaced. Others believe that it prematurely 
cuts off litigation. They draw parallels to a trilogy of summary judgment 
decisions from the 1980s (known as the Celotex Trilogy)41 which eased 
standards for summary judgment. Many feared that these decisions 
permit courts to decide cases too soon and thereby deny parties their 
right to jury trial. The parallel is well taken. Common to both is the idea 
that courts are deciding cases before they are ready for decision on their 
merits. 
Iqbal, Twombly, and the Celotex trilogy are attempts to reconcile 
needs for accuracy and fairness on the one hand, with needs for efficient 
and free access on the other. Accuracy and fairness demand that courts 
consider all material issues in dispute between parties; efficient and free 
access require that the costs of proceedings be proportionate to the matter 
in controversy. 
There is no reason to believe that today's attempts to overcome the 
problem of the interdependency of law and fact will succeed where past 
attempts have failed. 
IV. THREE AMERICAN SYSTEM FAILURES 
All expected too much of lawyers and too little of judges; all relied 
on courts to decide issues and left lawyers to apply law. 
Although the three American systems of civil procedure have had 
different forms of pleading, all have given lawyers the lead roles in 
applying law. Lawyers choose which law applies and determine which 
elements are required for application. They decide whether facts that 
fulfill those elements are present. Only when lawyers cannot agree on 
law, fact or application of law to facts, are they to tum to the court. They 
38. Some critics charge that the Court has restored fact pleading without proper 
procedures of amendment of the Rules. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading 
Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 849, 
883-886 (2010). 
39. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 35, at 1191. 
40. See Edward A. Hartnett, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: 
Taming Twombly, even after Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 474 (2010). 
41. Matsushita Electric Industrial CO. Y. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); 
Anderson Y. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Celotex Corp. Y. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317 (1986). 
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are to present to the court a single issue (in common law pleading) or 
multiple issues (in fact and notice pleading) for the court to decide. 
Courts consider only the legal claims that the parties present.42 In 
common law pleading they could not consider other legal claims; they 
were bound by the cause of action chosen. In fact pleading and notice 
pleading, courts cannot easily raise other legal claims. They are 
supposed to be passive. It is up to the lawyers to identify and dispute 
issues that arise in applying law to facts. Courts need not concern 
themselves with whether all elements of a claim are proven so long as 
the unproven elements are not disputed. If a needed element is disputed 
and is not shown, they may dismiss the case as unproven without alerting 
the party. 
The three American systems of civil procedure have varied when 
they have required this issue definition to take place. In common law 
pleading, it was the goal of the pleading itself. In fact pleading under the 
codes, issue definition was intended to be subsequent to pleading and 
before trial,43 but many judges pushed parties to force issue definition in 
pleading.44 In notice pleading as contemplated when originally adopted 
in 1938 in the Federal Rules, issue definition was to occur in the pretrial 
phase.45 
A. Common Law Pleading 
Common law pleading required that parties agree to put a single 
point in issue, of law or of fact, to determine their controversy. The basis 
of their agreement was the "form of action." The plaintiff had the choice 
of the form of action. That choice forever determined the subsequent 
course of the lawsuit. It determined the law that governed the dispute. 
That law was contained in the form, which set forth the facts that 
plaintiff had to allege and prove. The form of action further determined 
the procedures that the court would follow in deciding the case and the 
remedy that the court could award. Defendant could respond 
substantively in three basic ways: accept the factual assertions and 
contest one point where the assertions did not fulfill a specific legal 
requirement, accept the law asserted and contest the truth of one fact 
material to application of that law, or accept the law and the truth of the 
42. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168-69 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (upholding partial birth abortion ban although noting validity under 
commerce clause not raised). 
43. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 
193 (2nd ed. 1994). 
44. Cf Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEx. 
L. REv. 1749, 1753 (1998). 
45. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). 
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facts, but assert a new ground why the court should not find defendant 
liable ("confession and avoidance"). No matter which course the parties 
chose, in classic common law pleading they could present only one issue 
to the court for decision. 
Common law pleading made proceedings efficient. There was only 
one issue. If it was an issue of law, no trial was needed. If it was an 
issue of fact, trial was a limited affair. The jury did not have to apply 
law to fact. That was predetermined by the form the plaintiff chose. 
Thus common law pleading made jury trial possible.46 
While common law pleading may have been efficient in producing 
results, it was deficient in deciding cases accurately and justly on the 
merits. It could not well determine law, find facts or apply law to facts. 
The substantive law of the forms of action was hopelessly out-of-date. 
Long before common law pleading was introduced to America, the 
development of forms of action was ended. There was a limited and 
unchanging selection. Those that presented themselves in the United 
States at the end of the eighteenth century were not suitable for the vast 
commercial developments of the nineteenth. The inadequacy of law led 
to inadequacy of fact finding. Parties had to fit contemporary facts into 
obsolete forms. They did this by making fictitious assertions. To do 
justice between the parties, and to preserve business for themselves, the 
courts allowed use of fictions. 
Even had there been a wider choice of forms to select from, 
common law pleading could not deal adequately with applying law to 
fact and the problem of the interdependency of law and fact. By forcing 
the parties to make one point determinative at an early stage, common 
law pleading condemned cases not to be decided on the merits, but to be 
determined on a point that might not be material to their claims of right. 
The plaintiff might choose one form of action thinking that it was 
suitable for his or her legal claim, only to discover facts that precluded 
that claim. Although those facts might support another claim, it was too 
late. The parties had already defined the issue that would determine the 
decision. 
Attempts were made to ameliorate the harshest effects of common 
law pleading. In some cases defendants were allowed to plead what was 
known as "the general issue." In these cases, they were not required to 
make one point determinative, but could require the plaintiff to prove all 
elements of his or her case. This approach, however, magnified 
problems that could already appear where the factual issue was 
complicated and created new ones in jury instruction. Where the fact to 
46. James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: u.s. Legal Methods 
and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 517, 559 (2006). 
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be proved was not clear, parties might present evidence at trial of matters 
not foreshadowed by the pleadings, which the other party would not be 
prepared to meet. What variance between pleading and proof at trial 
should a party be permitted? And if a party is permitted to plead the 
general issue, which facts must the jury then find? 
By 1847 the inadequacy of common law pleading was plain. Fifty 
lawyers in New York City led by David Dudley Field appealed to the 
New York State Legislature "that a radical reform of legal procedure in 
all its departments is demanded by the interests of justice and by the 
voice of the people.'.47 According to a less charitable critic, common law 
pleading had become "the fruitful mother of the rankest injustice.'.48 
B. Fact Pleading (Also Known as Code Pleading) 
In 1848 the New York legislature adopted what came to be known 
as the Field Code of Civil Procedure. The new code abolished the forms 
of action and "[a]ll the forms of pleading heretofore existing." It 
provided that henceforth there would be "but one form of action, for the 
enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress or prevention 
of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action.,,49 It 
required that the complaint contain "[a] statement of facts constituting 
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, 
and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to 
know what is intended.',50 Hence pleading under the code came to be 
known as fact pleading as well as code pleading. For the defendant's 
response, the Field Code created the "answer." It required that the 
answer contain "[i]n respect to each allegation of the complaint 
controverted by the defendant, a specific denial thereof, or of any 
knowledge thereof sufficient to form a belief,51 as well as "any new 
matter constituting a defence," which defense it required to be stated in 
language such as required of the complaint.52 The Field Code expressly 
47. Memorial of the Members of the Bar in the City of New-York, Relative to Legal 
Reform 1, Doc. No. 48, 2 N.Y. ASSEMBLY Doc. (Feb. 9, 1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, 
ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 261 (1884). 
48. Robert William Wells, Observations on the Pleadings and Practice of the Courts 
of Justice of Missouri: and, A Radical Change Therein Recommended, in A LETTER 
ADDRESSED TO THE "METROPOLITAN" (1847), substantially reprinted in Law Reform, 21 
U.S. MAG. & DEM. REv. 477, 482, 486 (1847). 
49. An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the 
Courts of this State, Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497 [hereinafter NEW 
YORK CODE), at § 62, page 510. 
50. NEW YORK CODE at § 120(2). 
51. NEWYORKCODEat§ 128(1). 
52. NEW YORK CODE at § 128(2). 
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allowed the defendant to "set forth in his answer, as many grounds of 
defense as he shall have.,,53 
In outward form, Field's code eliminated the danger of premature 
choice. No longer did plaintiffs have to choose a specific form of action. 
No longer did defendants have to pick one defense. Yet Field's code was 
no panacea. It produced problems of its own that are familiar to us to 
this day. It left determination of the issues in the hands of the lawyers; it 
made no satisfactory provision for their narrowing. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, in a case where there were a dozen causes 
of action, code pleading worked to "destroy the certainty and simplicity 
of all pleadings and introduce on the record an endless wrangle in 
writing, perplexing to the court, delaying and impeding the 
administration of justice.,,54 Proliferation of issues not only multiplied 
the number of issues that courts had to address but presented many 
opportunities for surprises at trial, when litigants raised facts that their 
adversaries had not anticipated or created legal issues that they had not 
expected. 
To reach a manageable number of issues, Field placed hope in truth 
and party goodwill. Common law pleading had compelled parties to rely 
on fictions and fictitious claims and in effect encouraged them to make 
untrue averments. Field's code demanded the actual facts.55 To 
discourage unfounded claims and defenses, the parties were to verify on 
oath the truth of their allegations. 56 According to the New York 
Commissioners, the parties would be "better acquainted beforehand with 
the really disputable points, and therefore more able to prepare for and 
point out to the Court and the jury those which are, and those which are 
not, disputed.,,57 
Code reformers did not rely on party goodwill alone. Advocates of 
code pleading, foremost among them Field himself, were also advocates 
of codification of substantive law. Had they been successful in codifying 
53. NEW YORK CODE at § 129. 
54. McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1858). 
55. E.g., NEW YORK CODE § 65, at 511 (abolishing "feigned issues"); id. § 91, at 
515, (requiring that actions be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest). 
56. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED To REVISE AND REFORM THE 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), reprinted in 2 A 
MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 160 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879); NEW YORK CODE 
§ 133, at 523. 
57. FIRST REpORT OF THE PRACfICE COMMISSION (Feb. 29, 1848), extensively 
excerpted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY 
FIELD 262, 274 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884); see Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a 
Description of a Country's Civil Procedure, 7 TvL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 139, 146 (1999) 
("Field believed that the verification of pleadings would lead to agreement on the truth of 
facts .... "). 
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substantive law, the number of possible causes of action would have 
been circumscribed and their content better defined. But Field's other 
codes failed of adoption. The proposed Civil Code three times passed 
the State Assembly only to be vetoed by the Governor twice and to fail in 
the Senate once. In the absence of codification, pleading remained 
difficult.58 
Lacking causes of action limited and defined in codes of substantive 
law, code pleading failed to bring litigation down to disputing a few 
precise points. Courts and lawyers responded in different ways, but both 
sought simplification of the case. Both of their approaches, however, 
worked against accurate decisions according to law. 
Courts sought to engraft on code pleading the old forms of action. 
That fit their mindset well. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]he 
distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, 
requiring different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely 
inseparable from the correct administration of justice in common law 
courtS.,,59 For their grafting they could rely on the requirement that the 
complaint include a "statement of facts constituting the cause of 
action.,,6o What constituted a cause of action became the focus of many 
legal battles at the tum of the twentieth century.61 Causes of action in 
complaints were scrutinized for sufficiency; variances in proof at trial 
were grounds for overturning verdicts.62 In effect, courts required 
lawyers to plead not just the facts of their dispute, but their legal 
consequences. In this view, Frederick William Maitland's famous 
statement of English law rings true of American as well: "The forms of 
action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves.,,63 
Lawyers-when they weren't trying to trip up adversaries for not 
stating a cause of action-tried to avoid the problem of syllogistic law 
58. Cf G.T. Bispham, Law in America, 1776-1876, 122 N. AM. REv. 154, 185-86 
(1876). 
[d. 
Whether the results of this simplification of procedure have been altogether 
desirable, may possibly be doubted. . .. [I]n the method of presenting a case 
for decision by mere statement and answer, there is lost that precise and clear 
definition of the exact points in dispute which is found when the technical 
forms of the pleading of the common law are skillfully and carefully applied 
[I]t is plain that at some stage or other of a judicial proceeding, 
immaterial and admitted facts must be eliminated, otherwise the investigation 
would become hopelessly prolonged and confused .... 
59. McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1857). 
60. NEwYORKCODE§ 120(2),at521. 
61. See Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE LJ. 817, 828 (1924); 
Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 354 (1934) 
62. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513 (2006). 
63. FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 1 
(A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1971) 
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application by turning trials into a contest between two "theories of the 
case." This approach basically throws syllogisms to the wind and has 
judge or jury choose between two competing narratives. 64 
In the view of some observers, the cure turned out to be as bad as 
the disease. 65 By the early twentieth century, at one extreme, code 
pleading was little better than common law pleading: parties were 
subjected to premature issue narrowing. At the other extreme, the 
number of issues was boundless, unknowable, and productive of surprise 
at trial. In the middle was the theory of the case, which denied applying 
law to facts. 
In 1906 Roscoe Pound, not yet Dean of Harvard Law School, gave 
law reform a big boost when he addressed the annual meeting of the 
American Bar Association about the: The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.66 That address has 
been much followed and commemorated. In 1913 Thomas W. Shelton, 
who for much of his professional life led the fight for what became the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, charged that the courts had become 
"the fencing schools of highly-trained pleaders" where justice was 
subordinated to technicality.,,67 In 1936, three decades after Pound 
presented his address, there was little controversy when the secretary of 
the Federal Rules drafting committee presented the committee draft with 
the seemingly provocative question: "What is the matter with present 
methods of the trial of cases? Every one, I think, will agree that our 
methods of procedure have three major faults. First, delay; second, 
expense; third, uncertainty.,,68 By then, the bar knew it was true.69 
64. See Edward D' Arcy, "Theory of the Case "-Wrecker of Law, 70 CENT. LJ. 294, 
295 (1910). 
65. Christopher M. Fainnan, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 987, 
990 (2003). 
66. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, Speech to the American Bar Association (Aug. 26, 1906), reprinted in 29 ANNv. 
REp. A.B.A. 395 (1906). The talk has been the subject of numerous follow-up 
conferences. See, e.g., THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE 
FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Centennial Reflections on 
Roscoe Pound's The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With The Administration of 
Justice, 48 S. TEX. L. REv. 849 (2007); Conference Of Chief Justices And Conference Of 
State Court Administrators Annual Meeting July 29-August 2, 2006 Indianapolis, 
Indiana: The Hundred-Year Run of Roscoe Pound, 82 IND. L.J. 1153 (2007); Symposium 
Issue: A Century Later: Answering Roscoe Pound's Call for Change in the 
Administration of Justice, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 489 (2007). See also James R. Maxeiner, 
1992: High Time For American Lawyers to Learn From Europe, or Roscoe Pound's 
1906 Address Revisited, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1991); Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's 
Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513 (2006). 
67. Thomas W. Shelton, The Reform of Judicial Procedure, 1 VA. L. REv. 89, 90 
(1913). 
68. William D. Mitchell, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 61 ANNu. REp. 
A.B.A. 423, 437 (1936). 
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C. Notice Pleading: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 
The Federal Rules made a major change in pleading: they 
essentially eliminated a role for it in formulating issues.7o Judge Charles 
E. Clark, the principal drafter of the Federal Rules, believed that the 
procedure codes had successfully abolished the forms of action and the 
separation of law and equity, but had failed in their attempt to substitute 
fact pleading for common law issue pleading.71 The reformers had not 
appreciated, he argued, that the difference between law and fact is one of 
degree. 72 A pleader often could not know his or her legal theory before 
the evidence was produced and, if he or she did, would not want to give 
the theory away.73 The code concept of cause of action, Clark claimed, 
had a "long, inglorious, and destructive career," and had "done more 
damage than ever the forms of action could possibly do.,,74 Clark 
advocated that one should "expect less" of pleading.75 He proposed 
abandoning both issue pleading of the common law and fact pleading of 
the codes and advocated adoption of "notice pleading." 
As a result, the Federal Rules "massively deemphasize[ ]" the role 
of pleadings.76 In a notice pleading system, the pleading tells the other 
side the general subject of the controversy and little more; in fact, the 
Federal Rules require only "a short and plain statement of the claim.'m 
The official forms make explicit how little is required. For example, a 
complaint for goods sold and delivered is sufficient if it states 
"Defendant owes plaintiff __ dollars for goods sold and delivered by 
plaintiff to defendant between June 1, 1936 and December 1, 1936.,,78 
Unlike common law pleading, the Federal Rules do not require that 
parties choose a legal form of action.79 Unlike code pleading, they do 
69. When Professor Rachlinski asks why reform now, one might answer that a 
generation of lawyers must first pass from the scene as was the case in the time between 
Pound's 1906 address and the Federal Rules' implementation in 1938. For the generation 
before Pound, fact pleading was the reform. See Leubsdorf, supra note 3 (noting that the 
myth of past reform impedes present reform and sarcastically dating the failure of the 
federal Rules to a 1975 revelation). 
70. Cf, Marcus, supra note 44, at 1749. 
71. Clark, History, supra note 18, at 544. 
72. Id. at 533-34. 
73. Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 YALE LJ. 259, 260 
(1926). 
74. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 312 (1938). 
75. See Clark, History, supra note 18, at 542. 
76. Fairman, supra note 65, at 990. 
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
78. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 5. 
79. Fairman, supra note 65, at 1001. 
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not require that parties plead all the elements of a cause of action.80 The 
Federal Rules do not normally require that parties even state the facts 
that support the claims they make.81 
Just as their code reformer predecessors had, the drafters of the 
Federal Rules put a great deal of faith in the power of truth and goodwill. 
According to Professor Edson R. Sunderland, drafter of the pretrial 
procedures of the Federal Rules, the great weakness of pleading for 
developing issues of fact for trial was its "total lack of any machinery for 
testing the factual basis for the pleaders' allegations and denials.,,82 
Discovery is a means for the parties, prior to trial, to learn the substance 
of each other's cases. The theory is that once both sides know the full 
truth, they can either settle the case themselves, or can at least agree on 
which issues are material to decision. Should the parties be unwilling to 
agree, where there is no reasonable dispute about the facts, the court may 
determine those claims upon motion for summary judgment. According 
to the Supreme Court, the system "relies on liberal discovery rules and 
summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to 
dispose of unmeritorious claims.,,83 
While discovery is the most used device to accomplish issue 
narrowing, Clark and Sunderland provided other devices for defining 
issues some of which were innovations of the time: they regularized 
judicial review of complaints, pretrial conferences and summary 
judgments. All of these devices anticipate greater activity on the part of 
judges, which Sutherland welcomed. He wrote of pretrial conferences 
that "there is no reason the court should not itself take a hand in the 
investigation, supplementing the proceedings and the discovery which 
the parties have obtained, by direct interrogation of counselor parties in 
the presence of each other, with a view to eliminating issues through 
admissions or through the withdrawal of allegations or denials, or by 
obtaining the consent of the parties to the limitation or simplification of 
80. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Bennett v. Schmit, 
153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998); Fairman, supra note 65, at 1001 n.95 (citing Strong v. 
David, 297 F.3d 646,649 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
81. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an 
Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1981, 1988 (2004) 
("The common law system almost automatically accomplished the diagnosis: the formal 
procedures integrated law and fact."). See FED. R. CN. P. 9(b) (stating that pleading 
requirements for fraud or mistake are higher than mere notice: these claims must be 
stated with "particularity"). But see Fairman, supra note 65, at 1064 (questioning, but 
then essentially affirming the predominance of notice pleading). 
82. Id. 
83. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 
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proof.,,84 Yet none of these devices is mandatory. Sunderland, when 
asked at a conference why he had not made one such institution 
mandatory, replied to laughter, that the courts would do as they wanted 
in any case.85 
While Clark and Sunderland provided numerous tools to facilitate 
framing issues, including discovery, pretrial conferences, stipulations, 
and summary judgment, for seventy years those tools have failed to 
work. They have failed to work because they are largely in the hands of 
lawyers. What lawyers cannot agree upon, judges are loath to decide, for 
fear that they will foreclose parties from proving law or fact that only 
later is seen to be determinative. 
Should we expect lawyers to agree to simplify cases? In many 
instances, simplifying and expediting decisions is not in "the interests of 
both lawyers' clients." One party may wish to delay judgment. Even 
where both parties seek expedition, lawyer agreement is contrary to the 
mentalite of American advocacy. Professor John S. Beckerman sees 
"conflicts between discovery's cooperative ideal and the rest of 
adversarial litigation's aggressively partisan ethic" as a fatal flaw of 
discovery.86 Elliott Wilcox, an accomplished litigator strives through 
stipulations to narrow issues for trial, but despairs that it is not routine in 
a world where trial lawyers are trained "to think that every issue should 
be contested, every witness attacked, and every opponent destroyed. ,,87 
There is irony that one tool provided by the drafters to facilitate 
determining issues and facilitating trials, namely discovery, has been 
used, through lawyer control, to extend cases well beyond finding facts 
to fulfill elements of applicable laws. While many today find those 
wider uses valuable, and even characteristic of American law, there is no 
indication that the drafters of the Federal Rules anticipated such uses or 
the runaway discovery that we know today. Their expectation of 
pleading seems to have been that of one contemporary commentator who 
84. Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 
MICH. L. REv. 215, 218-219 (1937). Parallels to the German hearing seem apparent. See 
text infra at notes 100-101. 
85. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES CLEVELAND, Omo JULY 21, 22, 23, 
1938 (William w. Dawson ed., 1938). 
86. John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. 
REv. 505, 585 (2000). 
87. Elliott Wilcox, Sifting the Issues with Stipulations, TRIAL: J. AM. ASS'N FOR 
JUSTICE, vol. 44, p. 39 (July 2008) ("Why would two experienced attorneys, who were 
hoping for completely opposite outcomes, agree to stipulate to much? Because we know 
the strengths and weaknesses of our cases, we were able to identify the true issues that we 
needed to focus on. In short, we knew what mattered and, more important, what didn't 
matter."). 
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thought that that counsel would make a "conscious effort to frame ... 
allegations in accordance with a sound theory of recovery, based upon 
the facts which he expects later to establish . . .. [T]he complaint will 
give evidence of being grounded upon legal principles capable of 
supporting some form of judicial remedy or redress. ,,88 That same 
commentator anticipated the Iqbal decision: 
Recovery in the end must rest upon some sound theory; judges are 
only displaying good common sense when they look for it at the 
outset; nor, in the stress of present-day crowded dockets, can they be 
blamed for lack of sympathy for a point of view which would label as 
good legal form a manner of pleading calculated to postpone the 
determination of fundamental issues until a mass of evidence, 
adduced without reference to any previously indicated theory, has 
been pitchforked into the judicial arena.89 
Iqbal demonstrates the problem, but does not, as other contributors 
show, provide answers. The German system suggests solutions. 
V. ONE CIVIL LAW SUCCESS STORY: PARTY-COURT COOPERATION 
Pleading prepares the way to a day in court and leads to decision 
according to law. 90 
While for two centuries the United States has fretted over three 
major and many minor approaches to pleading and has flitted wildly 
from one to another, Germany has stuck with one approach nationally for 
130 years. Here we can only outline it in general terms in its specific 
role. In the forthcoming book we place it in the context of the overall 
process. 
In Germany pleadings help direct proceedings to decisions on the 
merits. In Germany pleadings help bound proceedings from going off 
into the immaterial. The key word is help. Pleadings are part of the 
overall process of applying law to fact. They begin that process; but they 
do not end it. They do not choose law; they do not define issues. 
What pleadings do is prepare the way for the first hearing, the day 
in court that every German litigant receives. At that first hearing, what 
88. 1 PALMER D. EDMUNDS, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 61 (1938). 
89. Id. 
90. A comprehensive and current English language introduction to current civil 
procedure by experts in American and German civil procedure is PETER MURRAY & ROLF 
STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE (2004). The leading German language works are LEO 
ROSENBERG, KARL-HEINZ SCHWAB & PETER GOTIWALD, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (16th ed., 
2004) (17th ed., 2010) and HEINZ THOMAS, HANS PUTZO, KLAUS REICHOLD & RAINER 
HOBTEGE, ZlVILPROZESSORDNUNG (27th ed., 2005) (30th ed., 2009). Matters not 
otherwise cited can be found in these three sources. 
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court and parties do together is to begin to identify the material issues in 
dispute. In the proceedings that follow, all parties are given an 
opportunity to take positions and present evidence on all material 
elements in dispute identified at that first hearing or in any subsequent 
proceedings. While the court makes some tentative decisions of disputed 
material issues, it makes no final decisions of material issues in dispute 
until the last oral hearing. 
A. Cooperative Law Applying 
To understand the place of pleadings in German procedure well, it is 
helpful to understand the respective roles of parties and judges in 
German civil procedure. Contrary to a misconception widely held in the 
United States, German civil proceedings are not inquisitoria1.91 
The principle that governs German civil procedure is the ancient 
Roman law maxim: da mihifactum, dabo tibijus. In English, the judge 
says, give me the facts and I will give you your right. German judges are 
not allowed to go out looking for facts. They may only measure against 
the law those facts that parties present. They are not inquisitors; they are 
facilitators. 
Parties must present facts. German judges do know the law against 
which they measure facts that the parties present. In the cooperative 
world of German civil procedure, German judges tell the parties which 
are the facts that parties must present if they are to prevail in their claims 
of right. That German judges tell the parties what the criteria for 
judgment are does not turn them into inquisitors. They are every bit as 
much neutral judges as are their American counterparts. 
German civil procedure is cooperative. Cooperation is part of the 
right to be heard. A "golden rule" of German procedure forbids surprise 
decisions.92 The Code of Civil Procedure imposes on judges a duty to 
elucidate the issues in the case. That rule requires that the court call to 
the parties' attention any legal rule that it intends to apply. It prohibits 
91. In a special section of the forthcoming book, "Day in Court or Inquisition," I 
argue that it is American discovery that is inquisitorial. 
92. Helmut RiiBmann, Grundregeln der Relationstechnik, available at 
http://ruessmann.jura.uni-sb.de/zp02004Norlesunglrelationstechnik.htm. Similarly a 
guiding principle of modem American procedure is: no surprises at trial, no surprise 
witness and no surprise testimony. David A. Sklansky and Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal 
Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L. J. 683, 713 (2006). Surprises undercut the right 
to a fair hearing. How the two systems go about preventing surprises helps understand 
differences between them. The American rule is directed to lawyers and to surprise at 
trial. Parties have panoramic discovery so that they may know all that there is to know 
about the case. If they fail to take advantage of this opportunity, they have only 
themselves to blame for resulting surprises. 
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the court from deciding any material and disputed issue without first 
giving each side an opportunity to address that issue. If the judge fails to 
elucidate the application of laws to fact fully, the surprised party has 
ground for appeal. The duty is vigorously enforced by appellate courts. 
The most material language of the rule is quoted in English translation in 
the margin.93 
The Code of Civil Procedure imposes on parties a duty of 
clarification that complements the judges' duty of elucidation.94 It 
requires parties to give declarations concerning facts completely and 
truthfully. The code provides that an asserted fact is to be treated as 
admitted if the other party is silent and fails to contest it. It allows only 
limited circumstances in which a mere denial or a claim of lack of 
knowledge serves to put a matter in dispute. In most cases parties must 
explicitly contest the fact asserted, and if the fact asserted is known or 
could be known to the party, then the party must substantiate its contrary 
contention with facts known to it. Thus, if in the course of the hearing or 
already in pleadings, one party admits a fact asserted by the other, there 
is no need to prove the fact. In relatively short order, the judge can 
inform the parties of the applicable legal rules and get their agreement on 
which matters of fact are material to those rules that are in dispute.95 
Americans are fond of sports analogies in discussing civil 
procedure. United States Chief Justice John Roberts in his confirmation 
hearings likened judges to baseball umpires. He said that it is the judge's 
93. Zivilprocessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 139, translated in 
MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 90, at 167-68: 
(1) The court is to discuss with the parties the relevant facts and issues in 
dispute from a factual and legal perspective to the extent reasonable and to 
raise questions. It is to cause the parties timely and completely to declare their 
positions concerning all material facts, especially to supplement insufficient 
references to the relevant facts, to designate the means of proof, and to set forth 
claims based on the facts asserted. 
(2) The court may base its decision on a claim, other than a minor or auxiliary 
claim, on a point of fact or law which a party has apparently overlooked or 
considered insignificant only if the court has called the parties' attention to the 
point and given opportunity for comment on it. The same provision applies if 
the court's understanding of a point of fact or law differs from the 
understanding of both parties. 
(paragraphs 3 to 5 are omitted). For a book-length academic treatment of the duty 
imposed on judges, see ROLF STORNER, DIE RICHTERLICHE AUFKLARUNGSPFLICHT 1M 
ZIVILPROZESS (1982). 
94. For a book-length academic analysis of the parties' duties, see ROLF STORNER, 
DIE AUFKLAAUNGSPFLICHT DER PARTEIEN DES ZIVILPROZESSES (1976). 
95. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges, supra note 27, at 479-80; Zivilprocessordnung 
[ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 138. 
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job "to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.,,96 Baseball is 
practically unknown in Germany, but there is a sports analogy that 
Germans might accept. It is not the analogy of the baseball umpire, but 
of the track & field referee. Referees do not run or jump, but they do 
direct participants more than do baseball umpires. High jump referees 
check contestants in for the competition, change the order or location of 
events, direct contestants where to practice, tell them what they must do, 
show them where they are to begin their jumps, signal when they may 
begin, measure how high they have jumped, consider all available 
evidence available to reach a fair determination that contestants have-
within the rules--cleared the bar, check all final measurements, measure 
and raise the crossbar, inform contestants when they have failed to 
correctly clear the high bar set, and determine whether they should have 
another chance to clear the bar.97 
B. Pleadings Prepare the Way for a Day in Court 
A German complaint is a map for resolution of a dispute, but it is 
not an itinerary. It facilitates travel without constraining it. Only at its 
outer edges does it set boundaries. This sets it apart from the complaint 
of classic American common law pleading, which allowed only one 
destination and only one route to it. 
In Germany, as in the United States, a lawsuit is commenced with 
the service of the complaint on the defendant. In Germany, the 
complaint is often the most important document before the COurt.98 
Reflecting that importance, a German lawyer's fee for a case consists of 
two principal halves: preparation of the case-drawing the complaint-
and representation of the client in the hearings that follow. 
The complaint sets out the factual basis of the claim, i.e., the 
concrete set of facts or life events from which the plaintiff claims right to 
a legal remedy. The complaint may, but need not, state the legal rule on 
which the right is based. The court knows the law and is expected to 
consider all legal rules possibly applicable to the facts presented by the 
plaintiff. The Roman law maxim-give me the facts, I will give you 
your right (da mihi factum, dabo tibi jus}--prevails. 
96. John Roberts, Opening statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
http://www.usatoday.comlnews/washingtonl2005-09-12-roberts-fulltext_x.htm (Sept. 12, 
2005) (transcribed by CQ Transcriptions: USA TODAY Posted 9/12/2005 4:31 PM). 
97. See USA TRACK & FIELD, 2009 COMPETITION RULES, Rules 125-127, 142, 148, 
180-182. 
98. FRANz-JOSEF RINSCHE, PROZEBTAKTIK: SACHEGERECHTE VERFAHRENSFUHRUNG 
DES RECHTSANWALTS 36 (1987). For a book-length practitioner's treatment of the 
complaint, see EGON SCHNEIDER, DIE KLAGE 1M ZIVILPROZESS: T AKTIK, PRAXIS, MUSTER 
414-17 (2000). 
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In Germany, the complaint must be "substantiated." That means 
that it must state the facts on which it rests as well as identify the 
evidence to be used to establish those facts. The complaint must state 
facts so exactly that, based on the information provided, the court could 
determine that the legal relief sought should be granted, if the allegations 
are true. The degree of substantiation required for each fact alleged 
varies. When a fact is not seriously disputed, it can be stated in general 
tenus. When it is disputed, it should be substantiated precisely. 
Proffering too little support in the initial complaint is ordinarily not fatal, 
but good practice is to err by substantiating too much rather than too 
little. In Iqbal terms, that is plausibility plus, but with an important 
difference: the plaintiff establishes plausibility. 
If the plaintiff has more than one possible legal claim, the complaint 
should state facts that satisfy all the requisite elements of each claim. 
Facts that do not support one of the elements of a possible claim have no 
place in a complaint. 
C. Pleadings Bound Proceedings 
In Germany pleadings bound proceedings; the complaint determines 
the matter in controversy. The matter in controversy is a central concept 
of German civil procedure. The matter in controversy determines not 
only the definiteness of the complaint, but also subject matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, joinder of claims and of parties, 
amendments of the complaint, and effect of the lawsuit for pending and 
future lawsuits. The matter in controversy is defined in life tenus; it is 
the constellation of facts that are to be judged in the case. It is not based 
on legal characterizations of those facts. Judging the facts is the job of 
the judge. 
In Germany, while the complaint contributes to bounding 
proceedings, it is not the first line of defense against frivolous lawsuits.99 
The fee system is: losers pay. How much they pay is determined by 
how much of the amount in controversy winners win. Claim €1O,OOO, 
but win only €9,000, and one is entitled to reimbursement of only 90% of 
costs and fees and must pay 10% of the loser's costs and fees. 
Reimbursable fees are set by schedules that are pegged to the amount in 
controversy. The fee system discourages making frivolous claims or 
inflating sound ones. To lower process risks, "claim splitting," that is, 
suing only for part of the claim, e.g., only one of six missed monthly 
payments, is common. 
99. Compare Marcus, supra note 44, at 1756. 
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In Germany, the complaint likewise is not the first line of defense 
against burdensome discovery. Judicial supervision of evidence taking 
is. Parties do not have license to take evidence on their own. They must 
request that the court take evidence. While judges are obligated to be 
generous in allowing the taking of evidence, they are vigilant in 
restricting the taking of evidence to material matters in dispute between 
the parties. Often taking of evidence is not necessary: the pleadings and 
subsequent admissions by parties permit decision without oral testimony. 
In Germany, judges do not have to engage in the kind of personal 
judgment of complaints that American scholars rightly fear of 
"plausibility" reviews here. In Germany, judges determine whether a 
complaint states allegations that fulfill the statutory elements of the law. 
Whether those allegations are plausible depends not on the imagination 
and preconception of judges, but whether the plaintiff is able to 
substantiate its claims with potential evidence that, if true, would prove 
the fact claimed. 
In Germany, the complaint is the first line of defense against judges 
who would range beyond the affairs the parties put to them for decision. 
The matter in controversy strictly limits the subject matter of the 
proceedings. The court has no authority to go beyond the matter in 
controversy, except as parties may appropriately raise additional claims. 
Were a judge to go off in a direction not within the matter in controversy, 
the affected party could complain. German judges, however, rarely are 
tempted to such diversions. Diversions can only cause them trouble. 
Affected parties can object and appeal to higher courts. German judges 
are professionals. Were they to divert proceedings to matters not 
germane to the dispute, their reputations would suffer. Their 
workloads-already substantial-would increase. 
D. From Pleadings to Proceedings: Reviewing Complaints 
In Germany, the court-not the plaintiff-serves the complaint. 
Before the court serves the complaint, the judge reviews the complaint 
for procedural prerequisites and for substantive soundness. The 
substantive review corresponds to a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
while the procedural review corresponds to the procedural defenses of a 
Rule 12(b) motion. The big difference from American practice is that a 
judge conducts the review in every case and before the court serves the 
complaint. 
If the judge finds that a complaint is deficient, on either procedural 
or substantive grounds, the judge is not to dismiss the complaint 
immediately, but is to call the deficiency to the attention of the plaintiff 
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and to request supplementation. If plaintiff fails to cure the deficiency, 
the judge may take evidence on the point. If still not satisfied, the judge 
dismisses the complaint. If the judge is satisfied with the complaint as 
supplemented, the judge has the complaint served. Should the judge 
dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff may make application for a higher 
court to determine the issue. 
Judicial pre-service review does not preclude the defendant, upon 
service, from challenging either procedural permissibility or substantive 
soundness. If the defendant does raise either challenge, the court may 
hold a hearing on the point. But the defendant must raise the issue 
immediately upon service. 
Dismissal prior to service spares the potential defendant the 
headache of a lawsuit altogether. It also saves the plaintiff substantial 
legal fees. Not only does plaintiff not have to pay the potential 
defendant's legal fee, the plaintiff has incurred only half the usual 
plaintiffs fee. Moreover, if the dismissal is the fault of the lawyer, the 
lawyer may forego the fee. 
E. Preparing for the (First) Day in Court 
Once the court has reviewed the complaint, it begins to plan 
proceedings to identify material issues in dispute which once resolved 
will permit it to apply law to facts. That is, it sets in motion the 
processes of bringing law and fact together to apply law. Essentially 
what the court does is to identify the legal rules likely applicable in the 
case and to compare them with the factual allegations and, if necessary, 
evidence presentations of the parties, to determine whether facts are 
present that fulfill all the requirements of one or more rules. 100 
Here we are on the borderline between pleadings that initiate 
proceedings and proceedings that eventually make possible deciding the 
case. We need to discuss just enough of those proceedings to understand 
the role of the pleadings. 
Coincident with preliminary review of the complaint the judge 
determines how the case is to proceed further: whether the case will use 
additional written proceedings or will use a so-called early first hearing. 
The judge's choice is pragmatic: the judge selects the method that the 
judge thinks is more likely in this case to be more efficient, i.e., is more 
likely to simplify and hasten framing of the material and disputed issues. 
Most German judges prefer early oral hearings in routine, contested 
cases. A party dissatisfied with the choice may request that the judge use 
100. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 823, 826-30 (1985). 
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the other method; in that case, the party must state why the other method 
would be more efficient. 
The goal of the preliminary hearing~r of written preliminary 
proceedings-is to identify the legal rules likely applicable, their 
constituent elements, and which facts material to their application are in 
dispute. Determination of which rules are applicable is tentative. While 
the court directs attention of the parties first to the factual elements of 
those rules most likely applicable, the parties are not precluded from 
returning to those rules not first considered should it appear later that 
they are applicable. 
In the preliminary hearing the court calls attention of the parties to 
those facts material to possibly applicable rules on which the parties do 
not agree. The court asks the party bearing the burden of proof for that 
element to present the necessary proof. The court may also alert the 
other side that at some point, that if the proposing party presents what it 
needs to, the burden of proof may shift to it. No longer will it be 
sufficient to challenge the proponent's proof, but it will be necessary to 
bring its own affirmative evidence. A classic example is product 
liability. Once a plaintiff makes certain showings, then it is up to the 
defendant to bring forward evidence that rebuts that showing. 
Most features of German civil procedure have their counterparts in 
American civil procedure; while those counterparts may have different 
foci or function somewhat differently, parallels are nonetheless clearly 
recognizable. The German hearing of the parties (Parteianhorung), on 
the other hand, has no counterpart in American civil procedure. A 
hearing of the parties is required either in the preliminary hearing or as a 
main hearing following the preliminary written procedures. In the 
hearing of the parties, the judge discusses the case directly with the 
parties and their lawyers. These discussions are not evidentiary. They 
do not constitute taking testimony of the parties. The judge clarifies the 
contentions of the parties and draws out the material issues in dispute 
between them. In short, the judge does what historic common law 
pleadings were supposed to do: ascertain the subject for decision. 
The court's clarification of the issues in the oral hearing largely 
supplants the pleadings as guide to resolution of the dispute. In the oral 
hearing the court identifies the possibly applicable legal rules, the 
elements of those rules, which elements are not in dispute, and which 
elements are contested. The complaint has now fulfilled its guidance 
function. 
Proceedings remain for the court through further hearings and 
through the taking of testimony to find the material, disputed facts and to 
test them as found against the applicable rules. 
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The interdependent nature of detenninations of law and findings of 
fact does not present insunnountable obstacles. Limited only by the 
matter in controversy itself, the court has little difficulty pivoting from 
one issue to another as detennined law or found facts may require. 
The pleadings have played a major role in facilitating the first day in 
court and leading the court toward a detennination of the dispute 
according to law. 
The efficacy of the pleadings is one reason that the Gennan 
Minister of Justice boldly asserts of law made in Gennany: 
The law is predictable, affordable and enforceable. Our legislation 
balances the various interests in a fair and equitable manner, ensuring 
just solutions. Everyone has access to justice, independent of their 
financial means. What's more, thanks to the efficient administration 
of justice, German courts decide without delay and German court 
orders will be enforced swiftly. After all, there is no use in having 
well-considered rules and regulations if the process of applying them 
proves too lengthy. 101 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We have seen that for two centuries American pleading has failed to 
work. It has failed to work because it has left defining issues to 
adversary lawyers. It has failed to work because it has been unable to 
overcome the challenge of the interdependent nature of detennining law 
and finding facts. 
From the above examination in conclusion I would like to point to 
three lessons: 
(1) Pleading can contribute positively to applying law to facts: 
Pleading is a part of an overall process of applying law to facts. 
That process brings law and facts together. Pleading is not an end in 
itself. There should be no pleading practice. Pleading should and can 
facilitate applying law to fact, accurately, fairly, expeditiously, and 
efficiently. 
(2) Gennan pleading and process show how pleading can help 
through giving a greater role to judges than American pleading has: 
101. LAW-MADE IN GERMANY: GLOBAL, EFFEKTIV, KOSTENOONSTIG (released 
October 2008). The brochure is introduced by the Minister of Justice, Brigitte Zypries. It 
states that it is published by Bundesnotarkammer, the Bundesrecbtsanwaltskammer, the 
Deutscher Anwaltverein, the Deutscher Notarverein and the Deutscher Ricbterbund. It is 
available at www.lawmadeingennany.de.Itis in parallel Gennan and English texts. 
Admiration for the Gennan system is long-standing. For example, Roscoe Pound, when 
criticizing the American system, spoke of the "wonderful mechanism of modern Gennan 
judicial administration .... " Pound, Causes supra note 66, at 397. 
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Give me the facts, I will give you your right, works. Parties 
cooperate with the court to determine whether facts fit the law. German 
judges are facilitators. 
(3) After two centuries it is time to draw on foreign experiences to 
develop new ways rather than to remain stuck recasting failed old ways. 
In 1851 a Massachusetts reform commission contemplated looking 
abroad for solutions but declined to do so. It saw borrowing from a 
foreign system of law as something "extremely hazardous and 
inconvenient.,,102 Better, it thought, "to take what we now have ... and 
amend and build upon it, not in a foreign style of architecture or with 
wholly new materials, but, as far as possible, with old materials and after 
the old fashions .... ,,103 One hundred and fifty-nine years is more than 
enough time to try. It's time to look abroad. 104 Is it too audacious to 
hope that we might follow health care reform with real legal reform? 
102. REpORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED To REVISE AND REFORM THE 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), reprinted in 2 A 
MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 159 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879) 
103. [d. 
104. Cf RUDOLPH VON JHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS, Part I, 9th ed. 1955, 
translated in KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
17 (Tony Weir, trans., Oxford University Press 3rd ed. 1998) ("The reception of foreign 
legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and need. No one 
bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, but only a 
fool would refuse quinine just because it didn't grow in his back garden."). 
*** 
